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Abstract 
This paper considers the effects of cyber operations 
on democratic processes from the normative 
framework of election law. The impacts of cyber 
operations on electoral transparency and 
participation, as well as on voters and the “free and 
fair” nature of elections are discussed,  from an 
Australian perspective. This paper identifies that the 
just threat of cyber operations may have a 
distortionary impact on electoral processes and 
concludes by making recommendations for further 
research and consideration. 
1. Introduction
On 19 June 2020, the Australian Prime Minister held 
a press conference to announce that the country was 
under cyber attack. All levels of government were 
being targeted in unprecedented cyber operations [1]. 
Also unprecedented was the announcement itself. 
Never before had the Prime Minister made a statement 
solely about cyber risk. The remarks came after 
months of federal government warnings about cyber 
threats [2], and a year after it was confirmed that the 
computer networks of the Australian Parliament, all 
major federal parties and possibly State electoral 
commissions had been hacked [3]. The consensus was 
that cyber risk extended across government.  
Successful democratic transitions of power rely 
on voter confidence in elections as being legitimate 
and free from interference. Electoral integrity, both 
actual and perceived, is a cornerstone of democracy 
[4].  The Prime Minister’s remarks were made during 
a new paradigm of cyber-enabled interference which 
threatens the integrity of Australian governments, 
parliamentary processes and elections. Cyber 
operations are often linked with the 2016 American 
presidential election [5]. However, the issue is a global 
one. Successful breaches of elections have been 
documented in France, Germany, Ukraine, Mexico, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Malaysia [6]. This new 
online threat landscape is largely the result of the 
digitisation of electoral processes combined with 
proliferation of online interference. Threat actors can 
target the communications and networks of electoral 
regulators and their staff, as well as political parties, 
candidates, and Parliaments [7].  
Despite the uptick in cyber operations targeting 
elections, they are rarely discussed from a law of 
democracy perspective. The aim of this paper is to 
begin to address that gap by outlining what cyber 
operations are and detailing their possible effects from 
the normative framework of election law. This 
question draws in a broad array of issues, and so the 
scope of this paper is limited by using “cyber 
operations” to refer just to access to and interference 
with digital networks, data and devices (excluding  
disinformation efforts). This paper will consider the 
impacts of cyber operations on public trust, and 
whether they could ever fulfil a democracy-protecting 
function. Existing legal responses will be briefly 
summarised, before recommendations are made. This 
paper concludes that both the actual and perceived 
distortionary impacts of cyber operations have the 
potential to undermine public trust. As a result, there 
may be a tension between two core tenets of election 
law as they relate to cyber operations: how to be 
transparent about cyber risk and breaches, while at the 
same time maintaining public trust in the integrity of 
an electoral process as being free from interference. In 
raising these issues, this paper offers a platform for 
further research into how election law concepts adapt 
and apply to an online environment.  
2. Method
From the normative framework of election law
[8], this paper will examine the phenomena of cyber 
operations on elections to assess what their effects are 
and to consider whether these effects are sufficiently 
distortionary to warrant a legal response. In answering 
these questions, this paper shall have resort to legal 





responses to cyber operations in domestic Australian 
law and international election law to inform 
conclusions and recommendations made on the basis 
of normative analysis. In terms of international 
“election law”, this paper focuses on Articles 19 and 
25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR), which provide for the rights to 
freedom of expression and of political participation, 
and which Australia has ratified. Public international 
law might also provide an avenue for recourse from 
cyber operations involving two State parties. 
However, substantive consideration of the area, 
including of the application of state sovereignty 
online, is outside the limited scope of this paper. 
3. What are cyber operations?
Cyber operations are part of a range of influence
instruments that also includes disinformation and 
misinformation campaigns. By contrast, 
disinformation campaigns (“information operations”) 
are “coordinated attempts to inauthentically 
manipulate an information environment in a systemic 
or strategic way" [9]. Cyber and information 
operations are closely related and often employed 
concurrently [10]. However, information operations 
implicate questions of truth in electoral politics that 
are beyond this paper’s scope. Cyber operations are 
covert activities carried out via digital infrastructure to 
gain access to a server or system in order to 
compromise its service, identify or introduce 
vulnerabilities, manipulate information or perform 
espionage [11]. The aim of cyber operations is usually 
to compromise the confidentiality, integrity, or 
availability of a system or the information it contains 
[12]. Cyber operations are often attributed or 
suspected to be carried out by foreign State or non-
State actors [13]. However, the focus of this paper is 
on cyber operations from the lens of election law, 
rather than a discussion of geopolitical effects [14].  
3.1. Kinds of cyber operations 
Cyber operations can take a variety of forms. Key 
examples are set out below to frame later discussion. 
3.1.1. Software vulnerabilities and malware. All 
software has vulnerabilities. Vulnerabilities include 
security flaws, glitches or other weaknesses that threat 
actors can exploit [15]. For instance, vulnerabilities in 
Microsoft’s exchange server were recently exploited 
to attack Western Australia’s Department of 
Parliamentary Services during the State’s 2021 
election [16]. Malware, such as ransomware, can be 
introduced onto a device or user account to penetrate 
a network by exploiting vulnerabilities or through user 
accounts [17].  
3.1.2. Data exfiltration or leak. Cyber operations 
often attempt to take (“exfiltrate”) data from victims. 
In an electoral context, this can be from elected 
officials, election regulators, political parties, or 
private service providers [18]. Information can also 
be exfiltrated and leaked for publication online [19]. 
Often the information taken is secret or 
compromising and leaked to gain a strategic 
advantage by embarrassing a target or shifting public 
debate. Exfiltrated information may also be 
manipulated before it is leaked [20]. Investigations 
into successful breaches of voter data, where nothing 
was done with the data taken, concluded that the 
objects of such breaches could have been to conduct 
surveillance, testing capabilities, or to undermine 
trust in election security [21]. 
3.1.3. DDoS attacks. Distributed denial of service 
(“DDoS”) attacks are when a threat actor coordinates 
multiple requests to a website or service with the 
object of overwhelming it and rendering it 
unavailable for access [22]. DDoS attacks have been 
successfully employed to take down the websites of 
electoral commissions, political parties, and civil 
society organisations.  
3.1.4. Phishing and spearphishing. “Phishing” 
attacks target large groups of people, usually via email 
or text, with false links to malicious websites, that 
commonly require usernames and passwords to gain 
access to networks, or payment information. 
“Spearphishing” is where phishing tactics are 
deployed against specific individuals [23].  
3.1.5. Supply chain attacks. Third party or supply-
chain attacks are when cyber operations are directed at 
vendors or other parties within a target’s supply chain 
[24]. These kinds of attacks have been used in electoral 
contexts to target voter registration infrastructure [25]. 
These kinds of attack highlight an important point - 
that all electoral actors and their contracted service 
providers could be targets in elections. 
4. Impacts of cyber operations on
elections
The starting point, from an election law 
perspective, is that every citizen is to have the right 
and opportunity to vote at genuine, periodic elections, 
by universal suffrage and held by secret ballot, 
guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the 
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electors [26]. The constitution of the “people” or 
electors whose will is expressed, and their trust in the 
“free and fair” nature of electoral processes and 
outcomes, are also key. Democracies are expected to 
protect the freedom of expression for citizens, 
including to impart information and ideas of all kinds, 
subject to limitations [27]. These freedoms are viewed 
as crucial in elections and has been interpreted broadly 
to require transparency of electoral processes [28]. 
Teasing out these elements, cyber operations may 
be seen to threaten (i) the transparency of electoral 
processes; (ii) political participation; (iii) citizens’ 
opportunity to vote and universal suffrage; and (iv) the 
“genuine” nature of elections, in the sense of them 
being “free and fair. These issues are considered in 
turn.  
4.1. Transparency 
Transparency is recognised as a pillar of an 
equitable legal framework that protects the freedom of 
expression in electoral processes [29]. Democracy 
requires truth in the contest of ideas [30]. The UN 
General Assembly has resolved that States should 
strive for transparency in all aspects of the electoral 
process [31]. States can do this by providing electors 
meaningful information that allows public scrutiny of 
the electoral process [32]. In the context of cyber 
operations, this may mean that transparent disclosure 
of successful, and possibly also attempted, cyber 
operations is required to afford public scrutiny. 
However, the nature of cyber operations means that 
achieving “transparency” is not necessarily 
straightforward. For other forms of electoral 
interference, such as fraud, governments have 
established mechanisms for investigating, notifying 
and responding to potential interference. For issues 
deemed to require public scrutiny to ensure 
transparency of electoral processes, such as political 
advertising and donations, the Australian Parliament 
has developed laws that impose compulsory reporting 
or disclosure requirements [33]. However, cyber 
operations can be difficult to identify and attribute, and 
mechanisms for responding to them are less 
established. In this context, transparency could be 
difficult to achieve. Complete transparency about 
cyber operations may also have unintended impacts on 
public trust. These issues are considered in turn.  
Identifying and attributing cyber operations can 
be time-consuming and resource-intensive [34]. 
However, in an electoral context, the prompt 
identification of cyber operations and attribution to 
threat actors is important [35]. This is because 
elections are held at a point in time, and so casting 
doubt on a result after it has been declared has a 
significant destabilising effect on the election 
outcome, undermining public trust in the elected 
government. States are moving more quickly to 
publicly investigate and attribute cyber operations and 
commence other enforcement responses [36]. 
However, not all States may have the capability to 
carry out such investigations.   
Further, when considering transparency, it is 
important to note the significant role of private actors 
(internet or cloud services providers) in electoral 
supply chains. Electoral commissions and 
governments rely heavily on the internet to 
communicate with the public and administrate 
elections (eg. voter registration), as do parties to 
campaign and the public to become informed about 
elections. Some private actors are playing proactive 
roles in attempting to prevent electoral interference 
online [37]. Given their greater ability to identify 
cyber operations on their platforms (relative to the 
State or political party actors they may provide 
services to), there is a question about whether it should 
be incumbent upon private actors to take steps to 
prevent electoral interference. The UN Special 
Rapporteur answers this question in the affirmative, 
with reference to the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights [38].  
Finally, underlying all of these issues is the risk 
that complete transparency about cyber threats could 
negatively impact public trust. There is evidence that 
just the perception of electoral manipulation can be as 
damaging for voter trust as actual manipulation [39]. 
Many argue that, on its own, the perceived threat of 
cyber operations alone has the potential to undermine 
public trust in elections [40]. Therefore, the impetus to 
“strive for transparency” in all aspects of the electoral 
process may have unexpected and potentially adverse 
effects from a law of democracy perspective if that 
impetus is applied to cyber operations. However 
equally, if electoral regulators were to delay breach 
disclosures and later be publicly found out to have 
done so, public trust in the electoral process could also 
be undermined.  These issues point to an important 
tension between the concurrent demands by election 
law for transparency to permit public scrutiny of 
electoral processes, and the impetus to preserve and 
protect public trust in those processes.   
4.2. Political participation 
Election law protects qualified electors’ rights to 
stand for office, subject to certain limitations [41]. In 
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Australia, most stand as members of political parties 
[42]. Political parties may be among some of the most 
vulnerable to cyber operations during elections, as 
they hold valuable information but have limited 
infrastructure [43]. In 2019, the networks of all three 
major Australian federal parties were the victims of 
successful cyber operations, as was the federal 
Department of Parliamentary Services [44]. As one 
elected official said to a joint Parliamentary 
committee: “[p]olitical parties are small organisations 
with only a few full-time staff, yet they collect, store 
and use large amounts of information about voters and 
communities" [45]. Threat actors could target the 
websites, personal accounts, networks and devices of 
political candidates and party staff [46] to exfiltrate 
sensitive campaign documents, voter information, and 
release that information, or to impede a party’s use of 
its devices and networks [47]. Hack and leak attacks 
on political parties have already been carried out with 
significant impacts on elections [48]. Under 
international election law, electors “should be able to 
form opinions independently free of …  manipulative 
interference of any kind” [49]. Political party hacks 
and leaks, depending on the information disclosed, 
have significant potential to constitute such 
“manipulative interference” and have a distortionary 
effect on electoral processes and outcomes that may 
warrant legal response.  
4.3. Voter suppression or interference 
Concerns have been raised about the scope for 
cyber operations that restrict or manipulate data on 
voter registration databases [50]. Theoretically, the 
result could be that voters would arrive at the polls 
only to be turned away because they could not prove 
their own identity [51]. Otherwise, as discussed, voter 
data could be exfiltrated, manipulated or leaked to 
undermine trust in election security. Electoral websites 
could also be compromised to post false content about 
voting processes such as where to vote [52]. Threat 
actors could also interfere with political communities 
by altering databases to exclude certain persons or 
classes of people from voting on a discriminatory 
basis, with a significant distortionary effect on 
electoral outcomes. Such measures may interfere with 
an elector’s right of free expression [53] and sow 
doubt about validity of an electoral result by limiting 
participation [54]. 
A UN Special Rapporteur has stated that 
interference with electoral databases and voters’ data 
is a critical threat to the integrity of elections and that 
voter records maintained by government authorities 
are particularly susceptible to hacking and other 
malicious attacks [55]. If such attacks were carried out 
in Australia, they could affect Australian electoral 
processes differently to other jurisdictions, as 
Australia has a system of compulsory voting [56]. 
Compulsory voting places obligations on citizens to 
register and demonstrate they voted, and regulators 
will follow up if records indicate that an individual did 
not vote [57]. While the potentially suppressive 
impacts of interference with voter registration may be 
moderated in this context, exfiltration of voter data 
could still undermine trust in a result.  
Separately, a lack of adequate security protocols 
and safeguards may lead to inadvertent exposures of 
private and confidential voter information [58]. If 
voter privacy is compromised, other damaging effects 
such as direct attack or pressure by malicious actors 
or, if voter information was leaked, from others, could 
result. The distortionary potential of cyber operations 
that target voter registration is therefore significant 
and may warrant legal response. The UN Special 
Rapporteur reports that it is incumbent upon States to 
enact measures to protect both the integrity of their 
systems and voter privacy [59]. Companies involved 
in electoral administration processes have also been 
called to develop privacy policies and safeguards to 
prevent interference with user data [60].  
4.4. “Free and fair” electoral processes 
For successful democratic transitions of 
government to take place, voters must have confidence 
that the process is legitimate. Cyber threat actors could 
attempt to undermine citizens’ opportunity to vote by 
tampering with election infrastructure [61]. This could 
be done, for instance, by disrupting electoral 
commissions via DDoS attacks or by compromising 
voting machines [62]. Such threats also imperil the 
secrecy of ballots. 
The UN Human Rights Committee has stated that 
voters should be protected from any unlawful or 
arbitrary interference with the voting process [63]. 
Cyber attacks are likely to be such “arbitrary 
interference”, to the extent that they disrupt a voter 
being informed or a vote being made or recorded. If 
electoral infrastructure is compromised, citizens’ 
freedom of expression may be limited.   
In recent years, electoral regulators have taken 
significant steps to secure themselves from such cyber 
operations [64]. Empirically, attacks on actual election 
infrastructure make up less than a fifth of all cyber 
threat activity against democratic processes worldwide 
[65] and are said to be amongst the most difficult to
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carry out [66]. Despite this, the public perception of 
attempted (but unsuccessful) operations may still have 
a significant impact on public trust in the outcome of 
an election, including by providing a basis for actors 
to cast doubt on the result [67].  
5. Analysis
5.1. Public trust 
A theme running through all of these potential 
impacts is the scope for cyber operations, or even the 
threat of them, to damage public trust in electoral 
processes [68]. There is therefore a tension, as 
highlighted, between two core aspects of the law of 
democracy as they relate to cyber operations – the 
requirement for transparency and the need to maintain 
public trust in the integrity of electoral processes. 
Mainstream voter comprehension of the nuance of 
cyber operations may be low. This may improve in the 
future, moderating the effect of breach disclosures on 
public trust. However, disclosing cyber risk has been 
seen to have significantly negative impacts on public 
discourse and perception of election integrity. Other 
issues that could threaten public trust in electoral 
processes and outcomes, such as political advertising 
and donations, have response and regulatory 
mechanisms which are well-developed and public 
understanding is well-established. By contrast, 
mechanisms for raising and responding to cyber risk 
in electoral processes are neither well-developed nor 
well-understood. By threatening public trust in 
electoral processes, cyber operations imperil the social 
contract aspect of elections, namely that by agreeing 
to and trusting an electoral process, people will trust 
and abide by a result, regardless of outcome. This is a 
significant and uniquely distortionary aspect of cyber 
operations in relation to elections which should not be 
understated. Government may seek to investigate how 
existing election law frameworks could be adapted, if 
at all, to respond to cyber risk. However, some of the 
unique aspects of cyber operations mentioned above, 
such as questions of attribution and the role of private 
internet actors, may render cyber operations a 
completely new issue for election law to contend with. 
5.2. Could cyber operations ever be 
democracy-protecting?  
One competing view is that cyber operations 
could, theoretically, fulfil a democracy-protecting 
function [69]. For instance, it is arguable that hack and 
leaks constitute a form of whistleblowing because they 
expose wrongdoing or information in the public 
interest. In such a scenario, cyber operations could be 
seen to promote the free flow of information and the 
contest of truth and ideas required for a democracy.  
While this argument may initially be attractive, 
there are multiple recent examples of hacked 
documents published during elections through 
whistleblowing platforms that were subsequently 
revealed to be the work of adverse State actors [70]. 
Indeed, so far, attributed cyber operations in relation 
to elections have more often than not been carried out 
by State actors [71]. Journalists and media outlets are 
often unknowing amplifiers of such interference [72]. 
The aforementioned challenges of attribution can 
often delay the identity of a threat actor being reported, 
if it is reported at all. 
Further, in functioning democracies, there should 
already be established processes for requesting and 
receiving government documents, including those 
held by electoral regulators [73]. The checks and 
balances embedded within such processes are what 
preserve the integrity of democratic institutions they 
bind. In democratic settings where such mechanisms 
are established and functioning, the scope for “public 
interest hacks” is likely reduced, as civil society actors 
who wish to access government documents will have 
means of doing so. The precedent of hack and leak 
operations later revealed to be by State actors could 
cast doubt on even truly “public interest” hacks, 
rendering them a net public detriment. Nevertheless, 
there is theoretically potential for cyber operations to 
be democracy-protecting, at least in cases where other 
lawful means of acquiring documents in the public 
interest have failed.  
6. Available legal responses
If a cyber operation in relation to an election
occurs, there are various legal responses available to 
Australian electors, political parties or governments 
who are affected. These are summarised below to 
supplement conclusions on the basis of the normative 
analysis of electoral impacts of cyber operations. An 
assessment of the efficacy of current law relevant to 
cyber operations in relation to elections is beyond the 
limited scope of this paper. However, 
recommendations are made as to issues that 
particularly require further consideration. 
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6.1. Enforcement and incident response 
powers  
Cyber operations are criminal offences under the 
Australian federal criminal code and the equivalent 
state provisions [74]. However, the transnational 
nature of cyber operations and fact that they are often 
carried out by foreign State or State-sponsored actors 
renders prosecution complex and difficult [75]. 
Preventative rather than enforcement responses may 
therefore be more important, and effective. 
In Australia, various federal agencies play roles in 
preventing, responding to and investigating cyber 
operations. Relevantly, under recent proposed 
amendments to the Security of Critical Infrastructure 
Act 2018 (Cth), one agency would be given special 
powers to assist organisations classified as “critical 
infrastructure” when they experience cyber attacks. 
This definition includes the IT systems of Parliament 
House and the Australian Electoral Commission 
(AEC) [76]. However, political parties and some 
third-party suppliers may not be captured by the 
“critical infrastructure” definition [77], and so would 
not engage the same response powers under the Act. 
6.2. Privacy and mandatory data breach 
notification requirements   
Australia has a mandatory data breach notification 
scheme that captures the AEC, meaning that data 
breaches (for instance, of voter data) that meet a 
certain threshold would have to be notified to affected 
persons and the federal privacy regulator. However, 
the scheme does not apply to state electoral regulators 
[78] or political parties [79]. Further, there is no
requirement to report attempted cyber operations.
Relevantly, in 2019 the AEC reported that it had not
been the subject of any successful cyber operations but
refused to answer whether any failed attempts had
been made to penetrate its networks in a recent
election [80]. The events engage the question of how
States can discharge their obligation to “strive for
transparency in all aspects of the electoral process”, in
the context of cyber risk [81]. It is worth noting that at
the time of writing, reviews of Australia’s cyber
security regulations and privacy laws are currently on
foot, and this legal context may change [82].
6.3. ICCPR 
The rights that individuals enjoy offline also 
apply online [83]. Protections under the ICCPR may 
therefore offer means of recourse from cyber attack. 
Article 2(3)(a) of the ICCPR requires State parties to 
ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms are 
violated shall have an effective remedy. Potential 
breaches of Articles 19 (free expression) and 25 
(political participation) that occur in the course of a 
cyber attack may engage States’ obligations to provide 
an effective remedy.  
The UN Special Rapporteur has said whether 
deliberate or inadvertent, interference with voter 
records will interfere with voters’ rights to freedom of 
expression and genuine democratic elections (as well 
as privacy). As a result, States’ obligations under the 
ICCPR to conduct appropriate investigations and 
provide effective remedies will be engaged [84]. On 
this approach, States will have obligations under the 
ICCPR to their own citizens to respond to cyber 
operations.  
However, there is a question over whether States 
also owe such obligations to citizens of other countries 
[85], and as to whether and what ICCPR obligations 
have extraterritorial effect [86] .Some argue that if the 
latter question were answered in the affirmative, it 
could provide a basis for arguing that a State has 
positive obligations to take proactive measures against 
cyber operations, as well as to mitigate their potential 
effects [87]. 
7. Recommendations and conclusion
On the basis of issues identified in this paper, the
following recommendations are made as a platform for 
further consideration and research.  
7.1. Recommendations 
7.1.1. Empirical research on the effects of breach 
disclosures on public trust. Many make the point that 
perceptions of cyber threats have a negative effect on 
public trust in elections. However, empirical evidence 
is limited. The absence of evidence does not 
necessarily mean that a response is not warranted (as 
is said to be the case with money in electoral politics, 
and “digital campaigning” [88], both areas where 
despite a lack of empirical evidence, legal responses 
have been taken).  
7.1.2. Consideration of whether and how existing 
election law frameworks can be adapted to 
respond to cyber risk. Electoral system design must 
build understanding and promote trust [89]. Platforms 
for future research include regulating for cyber risk in 
a similar manner to foreign donations [90] or, like 
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political advertising, by requiring the authentication 
of online speech or identity.  
7.1.3. Consideration of the role private service 
providers should have (if any) in relation to cyber 
risk to elections. Given the visibility private service 
providers may have of cyber operations on their 
platforms, there is a question over whether regulatory 
responses to cyber risk should provide private actors 
with roles or responsibilities in electoral contexts.  
7.1.4. Further consideration of whether it is 
necessary or desirable for political parties to have 
legal protection from or breach disclosure 
responsibilities in relation to cyber operations. In 
light of the potential regulatory gaps identified with 
respect to political parties in Australia (the definition 
of “critical infrastructure” and the exemption from 
application of privacy laws) renewed consideration of 
whether political parties warrant further legal 
protection in the context of cyber risk is justified. 
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